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Abstract 
According to economic theory, the incidence of a unit tax is independent of the statutory 
assignment of the liability to pay the tax. However, the theory is silent on the possible effects of 
market institutions on tax incidence. We report data from an experiment designed to address two 
questions. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax to sellers or to 
buyers? Is tax incidence independent of market institutions? We conduct laboratory experiments 
with double auction and posted offer markets. Based on the results of nonparametric and 
parametric tests of prices generated by laboratory markets, we conclude that the answer to both 
questions is “no”. We report that observed differences from liability side equivalence are 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. We also report that the incidence of the same 
tax differs between double auction and posted offer markets with the same demand and supply 
schedules. 
Keywords: tax incidence, market institutions, experiment  
 
JEL codes: C9, D4, H2
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Introduction 
To understand the distributional effects of a tax, it is necessary to know who ultimately 
bears its burden.  The theory of tax incidence is concerned with answering this very question, 
and there may not be a more important one in the field of public finance.  According to the 
liability side equivalence (LSE) hypothesis, the economic incidence of a unit tax is independent 
of the statutory assignment of liability to pay the tax when markets are perfectly competitive.  
Whether the tax is on the sellers or on the buyers in the market, the economic incidence of a tax 
is hypothesized to depend on the relative elasticities of supply and demand: the more inelastic of 
the two bears the greater burden.1  Moreover, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that symmetric 
markets satisfy LSE even when they are imperfectly competitive. 
Since governments rarely change the statutory assignment of the liability to pay tax, there 
are few opportunities to test the LSE hypothesis using observational data.2  However, there is a 
growing literature showing that behavioral, informational, and institutional factors influence the 
incidence of a tax.3  Markets need institutions to function.  These institutions specify how buyers 
and sellers interact to determine prices and quantities.  Different market institutions are known to 
have different price formation and quantity determination properties, and these properties may 
affect the incidence and excess burden of taxes.4 
Nevertheless, tax incidence theory does not specify market institution(s), so it is unclear 
what form of market exchange may or may not exhibit LSE.  Our central questions are whether 
the predictions of the theory are consistent with data from exchange in laboratory versions of two 
prominent market institutions, double auction (DA) and posted offer (PO) markets.  To gain 
insight into the effect of market institutions on tax incidence, we conduct experiments comparing 
computerized DA and PO markets.  
4 
 
The rules of the DA market in our experiments are a simplified version of those that 
govern trading on the New York Stock Exchange and on many other stock, commodities, and 
futures markets.  An experimental DA market is open for a specified interval of time; buyers are 
free to announce bid prices for the abstract commodity they wish to buy and sellers are free to 
announce ask prices for the commodity they wish to sell.  In the simplified DA markets used in 
many experiments, including ours, each bid, ask, or contract is for a single unit.  Actual trade 
occurs when a seller accepts the most attractive bid price, or a buyer accepts the most attractive 
ask price, among the outstanding bids and asks. 
The rules of the PO market in our experiments resemble those that govern most of the 
consumer goods markets in developed countries.  Think, for example, of a supermarket or 
department store.  Sellers post prices for a commodity and may also limit the quantities they are 
willing to sell to “stock on hand”. Buyers make the decision to buy or not to buy from alternative 
sellers at their posted prices.5  The computerized PO markets in our experiments are simplified 
versions of this field institution. 
In addition to testing LSE, we also pose and attempt to answer a new question: Is tax 
incidence independent of the market institution? In other words, for a given assignment of the 
liability to pay tax, does tax incidence vary between market institutions? Given the current state 
of tax-incidence theory, we continue to assume that tax incidence depends solely on the relative 
elasticities of supply and demand. Applying this assumption in the current context implies that 
tax incidence should be independent of market institutions, especially when markets are 
symmetric.  For ease of reference, we henceforth refer to this prediction as the independence of 
market institutions (IMI) hypothesis.  This question is not addressed in the previous literature on 
tax incidence. This illustrates the fact that the public finance literature has not done an adequate 
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job of grappling with the extensive literature on market institutions.  Given the practical 
importance of tax incidence to tax policy design, it is difficult to overstate the importance of 
investigating the implications of market institutions for tax incidence. 
Our baseline experimental design includes four treatments that use the same symmetric 
supply and demand schedules: (1) a double-auction market with a unit tax on the buyer (DATB); 
(2) a double-auction market with a unit tax on the seller (DATS); (3) a posted-offer market with 
a unit tax on the buyer (POTB); and (4) a posted-offer market with a unit tax on the seller 
(POTS). We report several nonparametric and parametric tests of the LSE and IMI hypotheses.  
We also estimate Random Effects (RE) models with bootstrap clustered standard errors to test 
these hypotheses. In the four baseline treatments described above, the tests reject both the LSE 
and IMI hypotheses at conventional levels of statistical significance.  Furthermore, we report 
evidence that deviations from LSE are economically meaningful for all but the DATB treatment. 
We are not the first to propose testing the LSE hypothesis in a laboratory setting.  
Kachelmeier, Limberg, and Schedewald (1994), Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), Borck et 
al. (2002), Riedl and Tyran (2005), and Ruffle (2005) test the LSE hypothesis in laboratory 
settings using a variety of tax types and institutions. We provide a more elaborate review of the 
literature in the Online Supplement. The study by Borck et al. (2002) most resembles our 
approach. They test the LSE hypothesis in DA and PO markets, using a unit tax.  They fail to 
reject the LSE hypothesis for either market institution.  They do not report whether tax incidence 
differs between the two market institutions, which is one of our central questions.  We compare 
our findings with theirs in greater detail in the conclusion to this paper. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
conceptual framework, and section 3 describes our experimental design and protocol. Section 4 
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explains the baseline results. In section 5, we examine the robustness of our conclusions to 
alternative experimental designs and discuss the external validity of our main results. Section 6 
concludes. 
Price formation in market institutions 
DA and PO market institutions are known to have different price formation and quantity 
determination properties.  These differing properties may affect the incidence and excess burden 
of taxes.  Smith (1976b), Williams (1980), Smith et al. (1982), and Smith and Williams (1983) 
report the robust result that DA markets converge rapidly to competitive equilibrium quantities, 
thus exhausting the potential gains from trade.  Although DA markets do not operate in the 
manner described by the model of perfect competition, they do achieve the Pareto efficient 
allocation of competitive market theory.  Also, price convergence in DA markets with symmetric 
demand and supply schedules is unbiased, neither converging consistently from above or below 
(Smith and Williams 1982).  Therefore, the DA market institution with symmetric demand and 
supply schedules seems like a promising candidate to exhibit LSE.   
Plott and Smith (1978), Williams (1980), Hong and Plott (1982), Smith (1982b), and 
Ketcham, Smith, and Williams (1984) report that PO markets produce prices that converge to an 
equilibrium, although not necessarily a competitive one, and also yield less efficient allocations 
than DA markets.  Consequently, PO markets may not exhibit LSE. PO exchange, however, is 
the most common retail market institution in advanced market economies; thus, it is important to 
investigate the effect of this market institution on tax incidence. 
Finally, given the different efficiency and price-convergence properties of the DA and 
PO market institutions, it would not be surprising if the data reject the IMI hypothesis.  
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Experimental design and protocol 
We proceed in this section by describing our experimental design and protocol; then we 
discuss subject responses to the questionnaire and subject earnings in the four baseline 
treatments. 
Experimental design 
Following Smith (1976a and 1982a), we induce stationary demand and supply functions 
for a fictitious commodity.  There are five sellers and five buyers in any given market.  Each of 
the five sellers is assigned a cost of twenty-three experimental dollars (ED) for unit 1, twenty-six 
ED for unit 2, twenty-nine ED for unit 3, thirty-two ED for unit 4, thirty-five ED for unit 7, and 
thirty-eight ED for unit 6. These marginal costs identify the induced individual supply schedules 
used in the experiment. Each of the five buyers is assigned a value of fifty ED for unit 1, forty-
seven ED for unit 2, forty-four ED for unit 3, forty-one ED for unit 4, thirty-eight ED for unit 5, 
and thirty-five ED for unit 6. Figure A.1 in the Online Supplement illustrates the induced 
demand and supply schedules used throughout every treatment reported in this study. 
The symmetric market design is the discrete-variables analogue of a continuous-variables 
model of a market in which the own-price elasticity of demand equals the own-price elasticity of 
supply.  The induced demand and supply schedules are symmetric in several ways.  First, the 
market demand and supply schedules create equal buyer and seller surpluses at the competitive 
equilibrium quantity.  This is important because unequal buyer and seller surpluses can produce 
biased convergence paths even in a DA market (Smith and Williams 1982) and that may affect 
tax incidence.  Secondly, the symmetry of the market demand and supply schedules implies 
equal demand and supply price elasticities.  This supports clear tests of empirical incidence 
compared to a theoretical prediction of equal sharing of the tax burden.  A third way in which the 
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design is symmetric is across individual buyers and sellers.  Each buyer (respectively seller) has 
a unit at each of the induced demand (respectively supply) prices.  This provides equal payoff 
incentives across all subjects in the experiment. 
In the absence of a tax, the competitive equilibrium price tunnel is between thirty-five 
and thirty-eight ED, and the unique competitive equilibrium quantity is twenty-five units, 
consisting of five units traded by each of the five buyers and sellers.  With a unit tax of twelve 
ED, the competitive equilibrium price tunnel is between twenty-nine and forty-four ED, and the 
unique competitive equilibrium quantity is fifteen units, consisting of three units traded by each 
of the five buyers and sellers.  The quantity reduction from twenty-five to fifteen units implies an 
excess burden of the tax equal to sixty ED [= 5×(38 − 35) + 5×(41 − 32)]. 
To gauge the impact of market institutions on tax incidence, we change the type of 
market institution from a DA to a PO market, keeping the assignment of the liability to pay tax 
the same.  Similarly, we change the assignment of the liability to pay tax from the seller to the 
buyer, keeping the market institution the same, to gauge the impact of this change on the 
incidence of a tax.  The result is a two-by-two design with four treatment cells. 
We conduct a total of four sessions, where each session is devoted to one of our four 
treatment cells.  At the beginning of each session, the subject’s role as a buyer or a seller is 
randomly assigned by a computer and remains the same throughout the session.  In each session, 
four independent markets of the same type, consisting of five buyers and five sellers in each 
market, are simultaneously trading.  Each buyer and seller is given five (no-tax) infra-marginal 
units to buy or sell at the beginning of each trading period, and there are thirty trading periods in 
each of the four markets in a session.  In short, the experiment uses a between-subjects design, 
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with forty subjects randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller in equal numbers in each of 
the four treatments, resulting in a total of 160 subjects. 
Experimental protocol 
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects read detailed instructions 
appearing on their computer screens on how to interact with the computer to trade in the market.  
After the subjects read the instructions, summary instructions are projected on a screen and read 
to the subjects to increase understanding of the market participation process.  (Subject 
instructions are available at http://expecon.gsu.edu/jccox/subjects.html.)   Before actual trading 
periods begin, there are five practice trading periods.  These practice periods acquaint the 
subjects with the software and help them to understand the decision-making process.  Subjects 
are permitted to ask questions of the experimenter during written instruction and oral summary 
parts of a session and during practice trading periods.  After the practice periods, there are thirty 
actual trading periods in each session.  The total number of trading periods is not announced to 
the subjects.6 
Induced value and tax information given to subjects 
In the four baseline treatments, subjects are given the same information about induced 
marginal costs and values.  Costs and values are private information.  Throughout each session, 
the subjects are seated in a manner that protects the privacy of this information.  The amount of 
the unit tax (twelve ED) and the assignment of the liability to pay tax are clearly stated in both 
the detailed and summary subject instructions.  The costs, values, and tax per unit remain the 
same throughout each session. 
The tax as well as costs and values are made salient to the subjects.  A seller’s trading 
screen shows “cost per unit” in one column and the “cost plus tax per unit” in an adjacent 
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column.7  When the buyer is assigned the liability to pay the tax, the figures in these two 
columns are identical because the unit tax on the seller is equal to zero.  Similarly, a buyer’s 
trading screen shows “value per unit” in one column and the “value minus tax per unit” in an 
adjacent column.  When the seller is assigned the liability to pay the tax, the figures in these two 
columns are identical, because the unit tax on the buyer is equal to zero.  Further details on the 
exact layout of the buyer and seller trading screens are shown in the screen shots of the subject 
instructions in the URL above. . 
Double auction markets 
Two baseline treatments are conducted with DA markets. In one baseline treatment, the 
liability to pay tax is assigned to sellers and, in the other treatment, to buyers.  The assignment of 
the liability to pay tax is the only difference in the two baseline DA treatments.  The unit tax in 
both treatments is twelve ED.  In both treatments, sellers and buyers are given two and a half 
minutes to complete their transactions in each trading period.  The time remaining in the trading 
period, the subject’s own number of units available to buy or sell, own cumulative earnings, own 
profit or loss from each traded unit, outstanding bid and ask prices in the market, tax charged per 
unit, and the market transaction prices are displayed on the buyers’ and sellers’ trading screens 
throughout a trading period.  The bid, ask, and transaction price information provided on a 
subject’s computer screen is a characteristic of the DA market institution in the field. 
Posted offer markets 
The remaining two baseline treatments are PO markets. In this market institution, sellers 
make the first move by posting an offer price and the number of units they are willing to sell at 
that offer price.  Buyers then enter the market in a random queue, one by one, and accept the 
sellers’ offers if they find them attractive.  If an offer is accepted, then trade occurs.  In one 
11 
 
baseline PO treatment, the liability to pay the unit tax is assigned to sellers; in the other baseline 
treatment, it is assigned to buyers.  The assignment of the liability to pay tax is the only 
difference between these two baseline treatments.  Sellers have two and a half minutes to post 
offers in each trading period.  Each buyer has thirty seconds to accept (or not) one or more 
available offers.  The time remaining to make decisions, own number of units available to buy or 
sell, own cumulative earnings, own profit or loss from each traded unit, and the unit tax are 
displayed on the sellers’ and buyers’ trading screens throughout a trading period.  
In the baseline treatments of the PO market, a seller’s trading screen only lists the offers 
posted by oneself.  Sellers are not able to see the offers posted by other sellers in the market.  We 
believe that this feature of the treatment best reflects the field institution that we are trying to 
replicate in the laboratory.  In retail markets, for example, the PO market institution itself does 
not provide information on the prices posted by other sellers in the way that (bid and) ask prices 
are publicly provided to all sellers (and buyers) in DA markets.  While it is true that retail stores 
can conduct price surveillance and market studies, conducting such studies makes the point that 
the market institution itself does not provide pricing information to other sellers in the market.  
As one of our robustness checks, which are discussed in Section 5, we also report the results of 
PO treatments in which sellers observe the posted price-quantity pairs of other sellers.  This 
change in the experimental design has no effect on our conclusions.  
Because our choice of the baseline information conditions for PO markets differs from 
many PO market experiments reported in the existing literature, we provide a discussion of this 
experimental design feature in the Online Supplement. 
A buyer’s trading screen lists the number of units available for sale and the offer price 
corresponding to each of these units as posted by the sellers.  For further details on the trading 
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screen’s presentation of information and layout, please refer to the screenshots in the subject 
instructions in the URL above.. 
Subjects, questionnaire, and subject payments 
At the end of each session, the subjects are asked to complete a short survey.  The 
subjects are mostly undergraduate students at a large urban university in the United States.  They 
are nearly equally divided among class ranks, with twenty-five percent freshmen, thirty-one 
percent sophomores, twenty percent juniors, and twenty-two percent seniors.  Masters students 
make up the remaining two percent of the sample.  Approximately seventy-five percent of the 
subjects have previous experience in an experiment; fifty-nine percent are female; fifty-one 
percent are African-American; twenty percent are white; and fifteen percent are foreign born.  
The remaining fourteen percent are either Asian-American, Hispanic-American, or mixed race.  
The average age in our sample is twenty years old; the minimum age is eighteen years old; and 
the maximum age is twenty-four years old.  Additional descriptive information about the subjects 
is reported in Table A.1 in the Online Supplement. 
After completing the survey, subjects are paid their cumulative earnings for all thirty 
trading periods, using the conversion rate (one ED = $0.07) announced at the beginning of a 
session.  We pay subjects in a manner that prevents other subjects from observing their payment. 
Table A.2 in the Online Supplement reports the minimum, average, and maximum earnings for 
each of the four baseline treatments.  The average earnings by treatment are DATS ($26.99), 
DATB ($27.66), POTS ($20.12), and POTB ($20.79).  Completing a session takes 
approximately two hours; thus, average earnings exceed ten U.S. dollars per hour, which is a 
favorable hourly wage rate for student subjects.  Subjects also receive a five-dollar show-up fee 
over and above their cumulative earnings from participation in a session. 
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Analysis of the data from the baseline treatments 
In the initial trading periods of a session, there is a lot of “noise” in the transaction price 
series generated by a market, which reflects the price discovery process of the market institution. 
However, this noise fades away by the 15th trading period.  Once transaction prices converge to 
an equilibrium (not necessarily a competitive one), subsequent transaction prices vary about the 
equilibrium price.  In short, our laboratory market experiments produce time series data.  
Although we use a variety of nonparametric and parametric procedures for hypothesis testing, all 
of them presuppose that the data across trading periods are independent.  We conclude from a 
variety of statistical tests, which are discussed in greater detail in the Online Supplement, that it 
is appropriate to treat the time series generated by the last fifteen trading periods of our 
laboratory market experiments as the sum of a constant and an independent white-noise process.  
We interpret the expected value of the constant to be an equilibrium price.  Following the 
convention in the existing literature, we use the average buyer prices from each of the last fifteen 
trading periods for hypothesis testing.8 
Before turning to the discussion of our empirical results, we proceed below by describing 
our data analysis strategy. 
Data analysis strategy 
We report results from several distinct tests to ensure that our reported conclusions are 
robust to alternative statistical procedures.  In addition to the Student’s t-test with unequal 
variances, we report the results of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.9  The properties of these three nonparametric tests are described 
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in the Online Supplement in greater detail.  We proceed below by briefly describing a regression-
based test of the null hypotheses that are the focus of this research; then, we discuss our 
empirical results. 
 We estimate the following RE model: 
 P̅it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1T + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. (1) 
The dependent variable in (1) is the average buyer transaction price for trading period t (= 
16,…,30) of treatment i (= 1,…, 4 are the four treatments cells of the 2×2 design).  In the test of 
the LSE hypothesis, T=1 when the liability to pay the tax is on the buyer, and zero otherwise.  In 
the test of the IMI hypothesis, T=1 when the market institution is PO, and zero otherwise.  The 
random effect is designated by γt for the t
th trading period; and εit is a stochastic error term.  We 
cannot make valid inferences using robust standard errors because Skewness-Kurtosis test rejects 
the null hypothesis that the residuals from the four baseline RE regressions are normally 
distributed.  Therefore, we use bootstrap standard errors to improve inference.  The bootstrap 
distribution provides an almost exact approximation of the empirical distribution of the sample.  
In addition, Cameron et al. (2008) show that bootstrap clustered standard errors improve 
inference when there are a small number of clusters.  Accordingly, we report p-values computed 
with bootstrap clustered (at the market level) standard errors, using five thousand replications. 
Results from the four baseline treatments 
Now, we are ready to discuss our empirical results.  We investigate two questions in this 
research.  Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax for a given 
market institution? Is tax incidence independent of the market institution, keeping the assignment 
of the liability to pay the tax the same?  The former question is the LSE hypothesis, and the latter 
is the IMI hypothesis.  
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We begin with a preliminary investigation of the data.  Figure 1 consists of a set of four 
paired bar graphs illustrating the difference in the average buyer prices produced by the last 
fifteen trading periods from the four baseline comparisons of our two-by-two design.10  The 
differences in the relative heights of the paired bars reflects the differences in the average buyer 
prices of these pairwise comparisons.  The results of the Student’s t-tests of the null hypothesis 
of no difference in the averages of the buyer prices and the associated p-values for each 
comparison are reported in Table 1.  Since the Student’s t-test has the virtue of familiarity, we 
use this test for our preliminary look at the data.  
The LSE hypothesis predicts that tax-inclusive prices should be the same whether a tax is 
placed on the buyer or the seller.  We test this hypothesis for the DA market institution by 
comparing the averages of the buyer transaction prices produced by the DATB and DATS 
markets.  As reflected in the first pair of bar graphs of Figure 1, the difference in the averages of 
the buyer transaction prices produced by these two markets is equal to 0.61 ED.  The Student’s t-
test of the null hypothesis of no difference in the averages of the buyer prices -- reported in panel 
B1 of Table 1 -- is equal to 5.12 (p-value = 0.000).  Thus, the data reject the LSE hypothesis at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  This finding is rather surprising given the previous 
discussion of the competitive equilibrium price-convergence properties of DA markets. 
We also test the LSE hypothesis for the PO market institution.  As reflected in the 
relative heights of the second pair of bar graphs in Figure 1, the difference in the averages of the 
buyer transaction prices produced by the POTB and POTS markets is equal to 0.79 ED.  The 
Student’s t-test of no difference in the averages of the buyer transaction prices is equal to 5.85 
(p-value = 0.000), which is reported in panel B2 of Table 1. This test rejects the LSE hypothesis 
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for PO markets at conventional levels of statistical significance.  This finding is less surprising 
given the previous discussion of the price-convergence properties of PO markets. 
Now, we test the IMI hypothesis.  Given the differences in the price-convergence 
properties of DA and PO markets, we expect that that the data will reject this hypothesis.  We 
begin by testing the IMI hypothesis by comparing the averages of the buyer transaction prices 
produced by the DATB and POTB markets.  As evident from the relative heights of the third pair 
of bars in Figure 1, the difference for this comparison is equal to 2.15 ED.  As reported in panel 
B3 of Table 1, the Student’s t-test of no difference in the averages of the buyer transaction prices 
is equal to 25.85 (p-value = 0.000).  The data reject the IMI hypothesis for this comparison at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  Finally, the difference in the averages of the buyer 
transactions prices in the comparison of the POTS and DATS markets is 2.33 ED, which is 
reflected in the difference in the heights of the fourth pair of bars in Figure 1.  As reported in 
panel B4 of Table 1, the Student’s t-test of no difference in the averages in the buyer transaction 
prices from these two treatments is equal to 14.58 (p-value = 0.000).  The data reject IMI for this 
comparison at conventional levels of significance, as well.  
The Student’s t-test assumes that buyer prices are normally distributed.  If the buyer 
prices are independent draws from a normal distribution, then this assumption would be justified. 
However, Skewness-Kurtosis test rejects this hypothesis for the data produced by our four 
baseline treatments.  Therefore, inferences based on the Student’s t-test should be interpreted 
with caution, suggesting the importance of the nonparametric tests that we report next. 
Tests of the liability side equivalence hypothesis 
As before, we begin by examining the LSE hypothesis for DA markets by comparing the 
average buyer transaction prices produced by the DATB and DATS treatments.  The results of 
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the MWW, KS, and RE model tests of the null hypothesis of no price difference are reported in 
panel B1 of Table 1.  The MWW test is equal to -5.800 and is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  The data reject the null hypothesis that these two price series come from the 
same population.  This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the LSE hypothesis.  The KS 
and RE-model tests also reject the LSE hypothesis for DA markets at conventional levels of 
statistical significance. 
 The results of our tests of the LSE hypothesis for PO markets are reported in panel B2 of 
Table 1.  The MWW test is equal to -4.685 and is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Again, the data reject the null hypothesis that the POTB and POTS average buyer transaction 
prices come from the same population.  This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the 
LSE hypothesis.  The KS and RE-model tests also reject the LSE hypothesis for PO markets at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Tests of the independence of market institutions hypothesis 
Now, we turn to our second question: Is the incidence of a tax independent of the type of 
market institution, holding the assignment of the liability to pay tax the same.  Initially, we test 
the IMI hypothesis by comparing the averages of the buyer transaction prices produced by the 
DATB and POTB markets from the final fifteen trading periods.  The tests of this hypothesis are 
reported in panel B3 of Table 1.  The MWW test of -43.511 rejects the null hypothesis that these 
two price-series come from the same population at conventional levels of statistical significance.  
This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the IMI hypothesis.  The KS and RE-model 
tests also reject the IMI hypothesis for these two market institutions at conventional levels of 
statistical significance. 
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Finally, we test the IMI hypothesis by comparing the average buyer transaction prices 
from the DATS and POTS markets.  The results of the tests for this hypothesis are reported in 
panel B4 of Table 1.  The MWW test, which is equal to -9.316, rejects the null hypothesis that 
these two price series come from the same population at conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the IMI hypothesis.  The KS and 
RE-model tests also reject the IMI hypothesis for these two market institutions at conventional 
levels of statistical significance.  
In sum, the data generated by our baseline treatments soundly reject the LSE hypothesis 
for both the DA and PO market institutions using a variety of tests.  Similarly, the data rejects the 
IMI hypothesis for the DATB and POTB treatments as well as the DATS and POTS treatments 
using a variety of tests. 
Are the observed differences economically meaningful?  
We report ample evidence rejecting the LSE and IMI hypotheses.  Although the price 
differences discussed above are statistically significant at conventional levels using a variety of 
tests, it is also important to examine whether these differences are economically significant. 
We use several measures of economic significance.  We compare the proportions of the 
total tax revenue paid by buyers and sellers in the four baseline treatments and, in Table 2, we 
report the average quantities, average excess burdens, excess burden as a proportion of tax 
revenue, and excess burden as a proportion of participant earnings using the data generated by 
the last fifteen trading periods for each of the four baseline comparisons.   
Since we use a symmetric design, the theory of tax incidence predicts that the tax burden 
will be equally shared between buyers and sellers.  We use the average value of the buyer 
transaction prices from the last fifteen trading periods from all four markets of the DATB 
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treatment to identify an equilibrium price.  As discussed in greater detail below, the average 
quantity in the DATB treatment is statistically indistinguishable from fifteen units at 
conventional levels of significance, and fifteen units is the post-tax equilibrium quantity 
predicted by the theory for the induced demand and supply schedules.  This justifies using the 
average buyer transaction price from the DATB treatment for hypothesis testing. We then use 
this equilibrium price to determine the incidence of the tax in each of our treatments.  In the 
DATB treatment, fifty percent of the tax burden is borne by buyers and fifty percent by sellers in 
the DATB treatment.  In the DATS markets, 55.1 percent of the tax revenue of 180.4 ED is 
borne by buyers and 44.9 percent by sellers.  In contrast, 67.9 percent of the tax revenue of 133.6 
ED is borne by buyers and 32.1 percent by sellers in the POTB markets.  The burden of the tax is 
even further shifted onto buyers in the POTS markets.  In this case, 74.5 percent of the tax 
revenue of 124.8 ED is borne by buyers and 25.5 percent by sellers.  Table A.3 of the Online 
Supplement reports average buyer prices and tax burdens as a percent of total tax revenues for 
the baseline treatments. Clearly, these differences in tax incidence among the four treatments are 
economically meaningful. 
 Now, we turn to the analysis of excess burdens.  In columns one through four and rows 
one through four of Table 2, we report whether the average quantity and average excess burden 
from the last fifteen trading periods are equal to the theoretical values of fifteen units and sixty 
ED, respectively, for each of the four baseline treatments. The average quantities reported in 
Table 2 are consistent with the observed differences in tax shifting documented in Table 1.  The 
average quantity in the DATB treatment is statistically indistinguishable from fifteen units, 
which is the post-tax equilibrium quantity predicted by the theory, at conventional levels of 
significance.  Furthermore, the average excess burdens from the DATB treatments are 
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statistically indistinguishable from sixty ED at conventional levels of significance, and sixty ED 
is the predicted value for a competitive equilibrium. In the DATS treatment, the average quantity 
is 15.03, which is statistically indistinguishable from the competitive equilibrium quantity of 
fifteen at conventional levels of significance.  However, the average excess burden is 63.85 ED, 
which is statistically different from the theoretical value at conventional values of significance.  
In contrast, the average quantities and excess burdens are strikingly different from the values 
predicted by competitive equilibrium in the POTB and POTS treatments.  The average quantity 
and average excess burden are statistically different from fifteen units and sixty ED, respectively, 
at conventional levels of significance.  Table 2 also shows that there are stark differences in 
excess burdens as a share of tax revenue and as a share of participant earnings among these 
treatments. 
In short, the data generated by the DATB treatment are consistent with the theory of tax 
incidence in symmetric markets as this treatment replicates the theoretical values of equilibrium 
quantity and excess burden.  Using this treatment as the benchmark, we find substantial 
differences in the average prices and quantities as well as the excess burdens as a share of 
participant earnings among the other three baseline treatments. 
In sum, contrary to the predictions of the LSE hypothesis, we report evidence that tax 
incidence is not independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax nor is it independent of 
the market institution.  We also find that these differences are economically meaningful for all 
but the DATB market institution. 
Robustness tests using alternative experimental designs 
We now ask whether our conclusions about the LSE and IMI hypotheses are robust to 
changing two features of our experimental design.  One feature is the information provided to 
21 
 
subjects in PO markets.  The second feature is the across-sessions treatment design in which 
market institution and liability to pay tax both vary across sessions.   
We now provide sellers with posted prices and quantity limits (henceforth price-quantity 
information) of competing sellers in the PO markets.  We also control for possible session effects 
by varying the liability to pay tax across markets within sessions of both DA and PO markets. 
This creates eight additional treatment cells. 
We begin by changing the price-quantity information provided to sellers in PO markets.  
In contrast to the low-information, baseline PO treatments in which sellers cannot observe the 
posted price-quantity information of other sellers, we now allow sellers to observe the price-
quantity information posted by the other sellers in PO markets.  We refer to the latter as the high 
information treatment.  As in the baseline treatment, we allow four POTB markets to trade 
simultaneously in one session and four POTS markets to trade simultaneously in another session.  
The result of this pairwise comparison is reported in column two of the uppermost panel of Table 
3.  As in the baseline treatment, all four tests reject the null hypothesis of no price difference in 
the comparison of POTB and POTS markets.  Therefore, we reject the LSE hypothesis at 
conventional levels of significance for PO markets when sellers can observe the price-quantity 
information of other sellers in the market. 
Next, we control for potential session effects by allowing two POTB and two POTS 
markets to trade simultaneously in the same session.  We conduct this treatment providing low 
information as in the baseline treatments and high information as in the alternative treatment that 
we just discussed in the previous paragraph.  The results of these treatments are reported in 
column two of the middle and lowermost panels, respectively, of Table 3.  Again, we reject the 
LSE hypothesis at conventional levels of statistical significance with all the tests, with two 
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exceptions.  The MWW and the RE-model tests fail to reject the LSE hypothesis when the PO 
treatments are run simultaneously in the same session with low information. 
We also report measures of economic significance for these alternative treatments in 
Table 2 and Table A.3 of the Online Supplement.  The average quantities and average excess 
burdens created by the markets in the alternative PO treatments are statistically significantly 
different from the theoretical values of fifteen units and sixty ED, respectively, at conventional 
levels of significance. 
Turning to the DA markets, we control for session effects by allowing two DATB and 
two DATS markets to trade simultaneously during the same session.11  The results of this 
experimental design are reported in column three of the lowermost panel of Table 3.  Both the 
MWW and Student’s t-test reject the null hypothesis of no price difference, but the KS and RE 
model tests fail to reject the LSE hypothesis.  In these two cases, the average quantities and 
average excess burdens are not statistically distinguishable from the values predicted by theory at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Now we turn to the alternative treatments for the IMI hypothesis, the results of which are 
reported in Table 4.  There are six additional comparisons for this hypothesis. The tests reported 
in the top, middle, and bottom panels show that our baseline conclusions rejecting the IMI 
hypothesis are robust to the two alternative experimental designs considered here. 
Comparison to previous literature and external validity 
Our conclusions differ from those of Borck et al. (2002) who fail to reject the hypothesis 
of liability side equivalence (LSE) with data from their posted offer (PO) markets.  The 
discrepancy between their conclusions and ours may reflect differences in our respective 
experimental designs and protocols. However, it may also reflect differences in our respective 
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statistical procedures.  As we have explained, our conclusions are based on several 
nonparametric and parametric tests.  Their conclusions are based solely on a test for statistical 
significance of a liability-treatment dummy variable from a random-effects, panel-data 
regression model using transaction prices from the last six rounds of their experiment (Borck et 
al. 2002, pg. 680). 
They generously provided us with the data from their PO treatments.  Using transaction 
prices from the last six rounds of these data, we replicated the summary statistics reported in 
Table 1 of their paper and their significance test which fails to reject the LSE hypothesis at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  However, we are not able to replicate the exact 
magnitude of the RE estimator reported in their paper.  We begin our analysis of their statistical 
procedures by computing the Skewness-Kurtosis test for normality of the distribution of the 
residuals from the RE model that we estimated using their data.  This test rejects normality of the 
error distribution at a p-value of 0.06, which suggests inference from a Student’s t-test of the 
estimated coefficient may not be valid and should be interpreted with caution.  Additionally, we 
estimated bootstrapped clustered (at the market level) standard errors of an RE model using their 
data.  The resulting p-value is equal to 0.063.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects LSE (p-
value = 0.016) as does the Student t-test with unequal variances (p-value = 0.045).  The Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test weakly rejects LSE with their data (p-value = 0.085).  Furthermore, if the 
LSE hypothesis is empirically valid then it should be equally likely that the average observed 
price with liability on the seller would be greater or less than the average observed price with 
liability on the buyer. Inspection of the data reported in Table 1 of the Borck et al. paper reveals 
that the average buyer transaction prices with buyer liability (POTB) are greater than the average 
prices with seller liability (POTS) in every round of the final six periods which they use for 
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hypothesis testing.  The nonparametric sign test rejects the LSE hypothesis (p-value = 0.016). 
We conclude that the Borck et al. PO data reject LSE at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
We conclude this section with a brief comment on the external validity of our results.  
We report evidence of greater tax shifting in the POTS treatments, which is consistent with 
econometric evidence of tax shifting in the analogous field institution.  Hanson and Sullivan 
(2009) use the occasion of a one dollar per pack increase in the cigarette excise tax in Wisconsin 
to estimate the incidence of a tax on cigarettes.  They report evidence that the tax increase is over 
shifted: the price per pack increases by $1.08 to $1.17 as result of a one dollar increase in the 
cigarette excise tax. Harris (1987) and Keeler et al. (1996) also report similar evidence of over 
shifting of cigarette excise taxes, using state level data for multiple states.  Finally, Besley and 
Rosen (1999) examine the incidence of state sales taxes.  They report evidence of full shifting of 
the tax for many commodities and over shifting for more than half of them.  It is interesting to 
find field evidence that is broadly consistent with the evidence from our laboratory POTS market 
treatments. 
Concluding remarks 
We analyze data from an experiment designed to examine two important questions 
regarding tax incidence.  Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax 
in either a double auction market or a posted offer market?  Is tax incidence independent of the 
market institution existing in the taxed market?  We report robust evidence that the assignment 
of the liability to pay tax, holding the market institution the same, and the type of market 
institution, holding the assignment of the liability to pay tax the same, both have a statistically 
significant effect on the incidence of a tax in the two market institutions examined in this study.  
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We find that these differences in incidence are economically meaningful in almost all 
comparisons. We report robust conclusions that hypotheses of (a) liability side equivalence and 
(b) independence of market institutions can be rejected with data from our experiments.   
Given the prominence of the LSE hypothesis in the public finance literature and the 
practical importance of tax incidence for tax policy design, we believe that our central findings 
that tax incidence depends on both assignment of liability to pay and on the existing market 
institution in the taxed market merit further study. 
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Table 1. Four baseline tests a 
Test statistics 
Baseline tests of the liability side equivalence hypothesis 
B1: DATB versus DATS B2: POTB versus POTS 
Number of observations = 120 
Number of observations = 
120 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances -5.116*** -5.852*** 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test -5.800*** -4.685*** 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 0.617*** 0.433*** 
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT) 
(with bootstrap standard errors) 
                  -0.610*                   -0.790** 
Test statistics 
Baseline tests of the tax-incidence equivalence of market 
institutions hypothesis 
B3: DATB versus POTB B4: DATS versus POTS 
Number of observations = 120 
Number of observations = 
120 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances -25.850*** -14.580*** 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test -43.511*** -9.316*** 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 0.983*** 0.917*** 
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT) 
(with bootstrap standard errors) 
2.149*** 2.329*** 
a * Statistically significant at the ten-percent level; ** statistically significant at the five-percent 
level; and *** statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
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Table 2. Average quantities and excess burdens a 
Treatment 
Average 
quantity 
(Units)b 
Average 
excess 
burden 
(ED)c 
Excess 
burden as a 
percent of 
tax revenue 
Excess 
burden as a 
percent of 
participant 
earnings 
1.     Double auction, tax on buyer, four 
markets trading in one session. 
15.10 60.82 33.44 21.91 
2.     Double auction, tax on seller, four 
markets trading in one session. 
15.03 63.85*** 35.39 23.65 
3.     Posted offer, tax on buyer, low 
information, four markets trading in 
one session. 
11.13*** 134.70*** 100.82 64.78 
4.     Posted offer, tax on seller, low 
information, four markets trading in 
one session. 
10.40*** 147.40*** 118.11 73.26 
5.   Double auction, tax on buyer, two 
markets trading in a mixed session  
15.17 61.20 33.62 22.26 
6.   Double auction, tax on seller, two 
markets trading in a mixed session  
15.17 62.40 34.28 22.93 
7.  Posted offer, tax on buyer, high 
information, four markets trading 
13.45*** 86.25*** 53.44 33.34 
8.  Posted offer, tax on seller, high 
information, four markets trading 
13.53*** 88.40*** 54.45 34.95 
9.  Posted offer, tax on buyer, low 
information, two markets trading in a 
mixed session with row 10 
10.70*** 142.00*** 110.59 67.38 
10. Posted offer, tax on seller, low 
information, two markets trading in a 
mixed session with row 9 
11.77*** 120.70*** 85.46 52.34 
11. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high 
information, two markets trading in 
mixed session with row 12 
13.87*** 79.7*** 47.89 31.16 
12. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high 
information, two markets trading in 
mixed session with row 11 
13.13*** 91.40*** 58.01 35.72 
a *** statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
b Tests of the null hypothesis that the quantity is equal to fifteen units, which is the value 
predicted by the theory. 
c Tests of the null hypothesis that the excess burden is equal to sixty ED, which is the value 
predicted by the theory.  
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Table 3. Robustness tests of the liability side equivalence hypothesis a 
Experimental design POTB vs. POTS DATB vs. DATS 
1. High information - different sessions Number of observations = 120 - b 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample 
test 
4.803*** -  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 0.450*** -  
Estimated coefficient from RE model 
(βT) (with bootstrap standard errors) 
0.374*** -  
Student’s t-test with unequal variances 10.139*** -  
2. Low information - same session Number of observations = 60 - c 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample 
test 
1.619 - 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 0.333*** - 
Estimated coefficient from RE model 
(βT) (with bootstrap standard errors) 
0.296 - 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances 5.365*** - 
3. High information - same session Number of observations = 60 Number of observations = 60 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample 
test 
-5.566*** -1.671* 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 0.700*** 0.300 
Estimated coefficient from RE model 
(βT) (with bootstrap standard errors) 
-0.378*** -0.170 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances -7.497*** -2.483** 
a * Statistically significant at the ten-percent level; ** statistically significant at the five-percent 
level; and *** statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
b This is the baseline test of the liability side equivalence hypothesis for DA markets, which is 
reported in the panel labelled B2 in Table 3. These tests are repeated here for ease of 
comparison. 
c The DA market institution by nature is a high information environment. Therefore, the low 
information attribute is not applicable here. 
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Table 4. Robustness tests of the tax-incidence equivalence of market institutions hypothesis a 
Experimental design DATB vs. POTB DATS vs. POTS 
1. Posted offer market is high information; DA and 
PO markets traded in separate sessions 
Number of 
observations = 120 
Number of 
observations = 120 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test -9.448*** -6.523*** 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 1.000*** 0.567*** 
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT) 
(with bootstrap standard errors) 
1.941*** 0.957** 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances -56.057*** -11.434*** 
2. Posted offer market is low information; DA and 
PO markets traded in the same session 
Number of 
observations = 60 
Number of 
observations = 60 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test -6.654*** -6.653*** 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 1.000*** 1.000*** 
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT) 
(with bootstrap standard errors) 
2.261*** 1.795*** 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances -30.554*** -29.087*** 
3. Post-offer market is high information; DA and 
PO markets traded in the same session 
Number of 
observations = 60 
Number of 
observations = 60 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test -6.210*** -6.653*** 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test 0.933*** 1.000*** 
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT) 
(with bootstrap standard errors) 
1.290*** 1.498*** 
Student’s t-test with unequal variances -16.983*** -38.360*** 
a * Statistically significant at the ten-percent level; ** statistically significant at the five-percent 
level; and *** statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
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Figure 1. Pair-wise comparisons of average buyer prices, using the last 15 trading periods 
of each market session
Notes:  DATB = double auction market with tax on buyer. 
  DATS = double auction market with tax on seller. 
  POTB = posted offer market with tax on buyer. 
POTS = posted offer market with tax on seller. 
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Notes 
1 Taxes could also be shifted backward onto the factors of production. 
2 An exception is Saez et al. (2012) who test the LSE hypothesis using data from change in the 
assignment of the liability to pay the payroll tax in Greece. Their data is not consistent with LSE. 
3 Using a laboratory experiment, Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) test the “Mill hypothesis” that the 
burden of an indirect tax may differ from that of a direct tax because the latter is more visible or 
salient. In a study using a field experiment and observational data on gasoline and liquor sales, 
Chetty et al. (2009) report evidence that tax salience has an impact on tax incidence. Finkelstein 
(2009) reports that salience influences the elasticity of demand for tolled roads. Morone and 
Nemore (2015) examine tax salience in a laboratory setting. They report that in tax-on-seller 
treatment prices are systematically greater, thus revealing a plausible tax-shifting phenomenon. 
4 See, for example, Ketcham, Smith, and Williams (1984), Plott and Smith (1978), Hong and 
Plott (1982), Smith (1982b), and Ketcham et al. (1984). 
5 Buyers choosing quantities at the posted prices does not, in itself, mean that buyers must be 
price takers.  Buyers can withhold demand to try to get sellers to post lower prices in subsequent 
market periods. Buyers may, however, choose to fully reveal demand at posted prices.    
6 In “commodity” double auctions such as ours, announcing or not announcing the end period is 
unlikely to affect trading. In contrast, in an asset double auction in which there can be price 
bubbles, this design feature can influence the price determination process.  
7 Chetty et al. (2009) defines “tax salience” to buyers as display of the gross-of-tax price (as we 
do in our experiment. 
8 Interestingly, if we use all the observations, rather than collapsing the observations into average 
prices for each trading period, our conclusions remain the same. 
9 Henceforth, we will refer to Student’s t-test with unequal variances as simply Student’s t-test. 
10 The choice of buyer or seller prices has no bearing on inferences drawn from the data. The 
difference between the buyer price and the seller price is always equal to the unit tax of twelve 
ED.  Comparisons across the four treatments would be the same if done with seller prices. 
11 By its very nature, DA markets provide high information on the price offers of other sellers in 
real time. Therefore, we cannot vary this feature of the experimental design for DA markets. 
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Introduction 
 In this Online Supplement to “Tax Incidence: Do Institution Matter? An Experimental 
Study,” we provide a more thorough review of the literature; a figure illustrating the induced 
supply and demand schedules (Figure A.1) and a related discussion; a description of the sample 
and subject payments and related tables (Tables A.1 and A.2); a more elaborate description of 
the data generating process that motivates our approach to hypothesis testing and a related figure 
(Figure A.3); a discussion of the information conditions used in laboratory posted offer markets; 
and a discussion about whether the observed differences among our treatments are economically 
meaningful and a related table (Table A.3).  
Literature review 
We are not the first to propose testing the LSE hypothesis in a laboratory setting.  
Kachelmeier, Limberg and Schedewald (1994), Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), Borck et 
al. (2002), Riedl and Tyran (2005), and Ruffle (2005) test the LSE hypothesis in laboratory 
settings using a variety of tax types and institutions. Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) test 
the LSE hypothesis by imposing a tax on either the proposer or the responder in a one-stage 
ultimatum bargaining game. They contend that the LSE hypothesis should hold in a tax version 
of the ultimatum game as long as the fairness norm threshold below which offers are rejected 
remains unaffected by a change in liability to pay the tax. They reject the LSE hypothesis with 
ultimatum game data at conventional levels of significance.  
Riedl and Tyran (2005) test the LSE hypothesis, using a gift-exchange game, with a PO 
market for labor. They contend that LSE should hold in gift-exchange games when gross wages 
adjust to changes in taxes and market participants are exclusively concerned with net-of-tax 
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profits and wages. Riedl and Tyran do not reject the LSE hypothesis at conventional levels of 
significance.  
Kachelmeier, Limberg, and Schedewald (1994) use an experimental design with two 
interrelated DA markets, three types of agents (customers, retailers, and wholesalers), and three 
tax instruments (an ad valorem tax levied on customers, a turnover tax levied on retailers, and a 
value-added tax levied on wholesalers and retailers). In their experiment, there are ten periods 
without a tax followed by ten periods with a tax. They do not reject the LSE hypothesis at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  
Borck et al. (2002) test the LSE hypothesis in PO markets, using a unit tax. In their 
experiment, there is no tax in the first twelve periods of a session followed by a unit tax in 
periods thirteen through twenty-four. They conduct ten sessions with PO markets and two 
sessions with DA markets. They do not reject the LSE hypothesis for either market institution. 
However, they do not report whether tax incidence differs between the two market institutions, 
which is one of our central questions.   
Ruffle (2005) tests the LSE hypothesis for taxes and subsidies. He uses a pit market 
where at least eight pairs of buyers and sellers participate in all experiments.11 There is no tax or 
subsidy in the first eight periods of a session. In periods nine to nineteen there is a tax or subsidy 
on either the buyers or the sellers. Ruffle’s tests do not reject the LSE hypothesis for either 
subsidies or taxes.  
Our experimental design differs from much of the existing literature in a number of 
important ways. First, our induced supply and demand schedules are symmetric both at the 
aggregate market level and the individual agent level. As Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show, LSE 
is independent of the market structure – perfectly or imperfectly competitive – when markets are 
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symmetric. Therefore, we use a symmetric design to test the LSE hypothesis in two prominent 
market institutions. Second, we introduce a unit tax in the initial trading period and maintain that 
tax throughout all thirty trading periods. Third, we present the buyers and sellers with 
information that makes the tax salient (see section 4.3 in the printed text). Fourth, in addition to 
testing the LSE hypothesis for two market institutions, we also pose and attempt to answer a new 
hypothesis: is tax incidence independent of the market institution. Fifth, we calculate the excess 
burden due to the unit tax for each of the four comparisons that result from our two-by-two 
design to gauge whether the observed differences in tax shifting are economically meaningful. 
Sixth, we use a variety of statistical tests and conduct a variety of robustness checks.  
Induced Demand and Supply Schedules 
Following Smith (1976a and 1982a), we induce stationary demand and supply functions 
for a fictitious commodity.  Figure A.1 of this Online Supplement illustrates the induced demand 
and supply schedules used in every treatment reported in this study. More specifically, there are 
five sellers and five buyers in any given market.  Each of the five sellers is assigned a cost of 
twenty-three experimental dollars (ED) for unit 1, twenty-six ED for unit 2, twenty-nine ED for 
unit 3, thirty-two ED for unit 4, thirty-five ED for unit 7, and thirty-eight ED for unit 6. These 
marginal costs identify the induced individual supply schedules used in the experiment. Each of 
the five buyers is assigned a value of fifty ED for unit 1, forty-seven ED for unit 2, forty-four ED 
for unit 3, forty-one ED for unit 4, thirty-eight ED for unit 5, and thirty-five ED for unit 6. 
Information condition in laboratory posted offer markets 
Our choice of the baseline information conditions for PO markets differs from many PO 
market experiments reported in the existing literature. We proceed below with a discussion of 
this experimental design feature. 
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In the baseline treatments of the PO market, a seller’s trading screen only lists the offers 
posted by oneself.  Sellers are not able to see the offers posted by other sellers in the market.  We 
believe that this feature of the treatment best reflects the field institution that we are trying to 
replicate in the laboratory.  In retail markets, for example, the PO market institution itself does 
not provide information on the prices posted by other sellers in the way that (bid and) ask prices 
are publicly provided to all sellers (and buyers) in DA markets.  While it is true that retail stores 
can conduct price surveillance and market studies, conducting such studies makes the point that 
the market institution itself does not provide pricing information to other sellers in the market.   
The original question posed in this article is whether tax incidence varies across market 
institutions given the information that is provided by the institutions themselves. This focus on 
the information-generating properties of a market institution reflects the view articulated by 
Smith (1982c). The DA market institution produces public information on bid prices, ask prices, 
and transaction prices. This is a feature of the market institution, itself, both in the laboratory and 
in organized exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange. In contrast, the PO market 
institution, itself, does not provide all of this information. With the PO market institution, 
information on competitors’ prices would have to come from some (possibly costly) activity − 
such as market surveillance − that is distinct from own-price posting and exchange in the market. 
The literature has been unclear on this point. Early PO market experiments were run in 
classrooms using a blackboard and chalk (Williams 1973); thus, there was no practical 
alternative to displaying all posted prices to all subjects, regardless of whether they were buyers 
or sellers.  
When it subsequently became possible to run computerized PO experiments, authors 
recognized that there was a choice to be made about whether to exhibit seller’s posted prices to 
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their competitors (Ketchum, Smith, and Williams 1984, p. 599). For reasons that are not clear in 
the literature, a common procedure in many computerized PO experiments is to reveal competing 
sellers’ prices, even though this is not an inherent feature of the PO market institution. As one of 
our robustness checks, which are discussed in section 5 of the printed version of the paper, we 
also report the results of PO treatments in which sellers observe the posted price-quantity pairs of 
other sellers.  This change in the experimental design has no effect on our conclusions. In sum, 
the present paper rejects the LSE hypothesis in PO markets; this finding is robust to the two 
alternative ways of implementing the PO market institution discussed above in a symmetric 
induced valuation environment. 
Subjects, questionnaire, and subject payments 
At the end of each session, the subjects are asked to complete a short survey.  Descriptive 
information about the subjects is reported in Table A.1 of this Online Supplement. The subjects 
are mostly undergraduate students at a large urban university in the United States.  They are 
nearly equally divided among class ranks, with twenty-five percent freshmen, thirty-one percent 
sophomores, twenty percent juniors, and twenty-two percent seniors.  Masters students make up 
the remaining two percent of the sample.  Approximately seventy-five percent of the subjects 
have previous experience in an experiment; fifty-nine percent are female; fifty-one percent are 
African-American; twenty percent are white; and fifteen percent are foreign born.  The 
remaining fourteen percent are either Asian-American, Hispanic-American, or mixed race.  The 
average age in our sample is twenty years old; the minimum age is eighteen years old; and the 
maximum age is twenty-four years old.   
After completing the survey, subjects are paid their cumulative earnings for all thirty 
trading periods, using the conversion rate (one ED = $0.07) announced at the beginning of a 
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session.  We pay subjects in a manner that prevents other subjects from observing their payment. 
Table A.2 in the Online Supplement reports the minimum, average, and maximum earnings for 
each of the four baseline treatments.  The average earnings by treatment are DATS ($26.99), 
DATB ($27.66), POTS ($20.12), and POTB ($20.79).  Completing a session takes 
approximately two hours; thus, average earnings exceed ten U.S. dollars per hour, which is a 
favorable hourly wage rate for student subjects.  Subjects also receive a five-dollar show-up fee 
over and above their cumulative earnings from participation in a session. 
Data generating process: what is an observation? 
The properties of the data produced by our laboratory experiments should inform our 
approach to hypothesis testing. Our laboratory market experiments produce time series data. 
There is a lot of “noise” in the price series in the initial trading periods in a market, which 
reflects the price discovery process of the market institution. As we show, however, this noise 
fades away by the 15th trading period. Once transactions prices have converged to an equilibrium 
(not necessarily a competitive one) subsequent transaction prices vary about this observed 
equilibrium price. In other words, the data generating process of our market experiments can be 
characterized as a moving average (MA) process. To make matters more concrete, a qth order 
MA process, denoted MA(q), is characterized as: 
 Pt = Pa + εt + θ1εt-1 + θ2εt-2 + … + θqεt-q. (1) 
Pt is the observed transaction price for the t
th trade (after the 15th trading period); Pa is the 
average of all observed transaction prices preceding the tth trade; and εt is assumed to be a white-
noise process or a sequence {εt} whose elements have mean zero and finite variance σ
2.  
Economic theory does not provide much guidance on the statistical properties of εt. In 
fact, an equilibrium price is not generally thought of as a random variable in the theoretical 
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literature. If, however, a price series produced by our laboratory markets converges to an 
equilibrium, the resulting random variable is said to be ergodic for the mean which implies that it 
is a covariance-stationary process or θs < 1 for all s (= 1,…,q).
11  Furthermore, if, after a 
sufficient number of trading periods, these observed transaction prices converge to an 
equilibrium and, in the words of Paul Samuelson (1993), “vibrate randomly”, then εt should be 
an independent white-noise process. This implies that θs = 0 for all s (= 1,…, q).
11  Lacking 
theoretical support for such an assumption, we rely on empirical evidence to guide us. 
Figure A.2 in the Online Supplement shows the plots of the autocorrelation functions of 
the transactions prices for the last fifteen trading periods for each of our four baseline treatments. 
The estimated autocorrelations in each of the four plots are well within the ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals, except for the first autocorrelation in the POTS treatment (see Figure A.2d). 
This autocorrelation is statistically significant at the five-percent level. We also conduct runs 
tests of serial independence using the last fifteen trading periods from the sixteen baseline 
markets. These tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of serial independence in fourteen out of the 
sixteen cases at the ten-percent significance level.  Pooling the market data by treatment, the runs 
tests are equal to -1.26 (p-value = 0.21) for the DATB price series; 1.07 (p-value = 0.29) for the 
DATS price series; -0.59 (p-value = 0.55) for the POTB price series; and -0.01 (p-value = 1.00) 
for the POTS price series. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of serial independence in all 
four cases.  
Based on the totality of the statistical evidence, we believe that it is appropriate to treat 
the price series from the last fifteen trading periods in our laboratory market experiments as the 
sum of a constant and an independent white-noise process. We interpret the expected value of the 
constant to be an equilibrium price. This implies that observed individual transaction prices 
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(from the final fifteen trading periods) can be used in hypothesis tests. Nonetheless, we follow 
the convention in the existing literature and use the average buyer prices for each of the last 
fifteen trading periods.11  However, and this is an important point, the statistical tests employed 
in this research, and discussed in greater detail below, assume that the data are independent. We 
cannot reject this hypothesis for our data.  
The Student’s t-test compares two samples by assuming there is no difference in the 
sample means. It computes a p-value for the null hypothesis that the sample means are equal by 
further assuming the samples are independent draws from a normal distribution.11  This property 
of the Student’s t-test is too restrictive in the current context because Skewness-Kurtosis tests 
reject the null hypothesis that the data generated by our laboratory market experiments are 
normally distributed at conventional levels of significance.11  In contrast, the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon (MWW) test compares two samples consisting of independent draws from a 
population by first ranking all the values from the two samples in ascending order, and then 
computes a p-value that depends on the discrepancy between the mean ranks of the two samples. 
In this sense, it is similar to a Student’s t-test; however, this nonparametric test requires no 
assumption about the distribution of the data. The intuition behind the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) test is straightforward. If two samples are independent draws from the same population, the 
two empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) should be reasonably similar. The KS 
test computes a p-value for the largest discrepancy between the two CDFs. If the maximum 
discrepancy is substantial in a statistical sense, the investigator can conclude that there is a high 
likelihood that the samples come from two different populations. Like the MWW test, the KS 
test is also nonparametric and requires no assumption about the distribution of the data.  
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Are the observed differences economically meaningful? 
Since we use a symmetric design, the theory of tax incidence predicts that the tax burden 
will be equally shared between buyers and sellers.  We use the average value of the buyer 
transaction prices from the last fifteen trading periods from all four markets of the DATB 
treatment to identify an equilibrium price.  As discussed in greater detail below, the average 
quantity in the DATB treatment is statistically indistinguishable from fifteen units at 
conventional levels of significance, and fifteen units is the post-tax equilibrium quantity 
predicted by the theory for the induced demand and supply schedules.  This justifies using the 
average buyer transaction price from the DATB treatment for hypothesis testing. We then use 
this equilibrium price to determine the incidence of the tax in each of our treatments.  
Table A.3 of this Online Supplement reports average buyer prices and tax burdens as a 
percent of total tax revenues.  In the DATB treatment, fifty percent of the tax burden is borne by 
buyers and fifty percent by sellers in the DATB treatment.  In the DATS markets, 55.1 percent of 
the tax revenue of 180.4 ED is borne by buyers and 44.9 percent by sellers.  In contrast, 67.9 
percent of the tax revenue of 133.6 ED is borne by buyers and 32.1 percent by sellers in the 
POTB markets.  The burden of the tax is even further shifted onto buyers in the POTS markets.  
In this case, 74.5 percent of the tax revenue of 124.8 ED is borne by buyers and 25.5 percent by 
sellers.  Clearly, these differences in tax incidence among the four treatments are economically 
meaningful. 
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    Table A.1. Demographic characteristics of the full sample of the baseline treatments 
Variable 
Baseline Treatments 
Full 
Double Auction Posted Offer 
Tax on 
seller 
Tax on 
buyer 
Tax on 
seller 
Tax on 
buyer 
Percent buyers 50 50 50 50 50 
Percent freshmen 25 15 30 30 25 
Percent sophomore 31 30 30 30 35 
Percent juniors  20 28 10 23 20 
Percent seniors 22 25 30 18 15 
Percent Masters students 2 3 0 0 5 
Percent with experience in experiments  76 78 78 75 73 
Percent female 59 55 68 63 50 
Percent African-American 51 48 43 58 58 
Percent Asian-American 4 3 0 5 8 
Percent Hispanic-American 2 5 3 0 0 
Percent mixed race 8 10 8 10 5 
Percent white 20 23 25 20 13 
Percent foreign born 15 13 23 8 18 
Average age  20 20 20 20 20 
Standard deviation of age  2 2 2 1 1 
Minimum age  18 18 18 18 18 
Maximum age  24 24 24 24 23 
Percent business administration majors 28 25 28 43 18 
Percent economics majors 6 0 5 3 15 
Percent other majors 0 0 0 0 0 
Percent with at least 1 economics course 55 53 58 58 53 
GPA between 1.25 and 2.74 (percent) 9 8 5 13 13 
GPA between 2.75 and 3.24 (percent) 29 48 28 25 18 
GPA between 3.25 and 3.74 (percent) 39 30 35 45 45 
GPA between 3.75 and 4.0 (percent) 19 10 30 13 23 
Not taken courses with grades (percent) 4 5 3 5 3 
Number of experimental subjects 160 40 40 40 40 
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Table A.2. Earnings in U.S. dollars, for the baseline treatments 
 
Earnings 
Baseline Treatments 
Full 
Double auction Posted offer 
tax on 
seller 
tax on 
buyer 
tax on 
seller 
tax on 
buyer 
Minimum Earnings $6.75 $14.25 $16.75 $9.25 $6.75 
Average Earnings $23.89 $26.99 $27.66 $20.12 $20.79 
Maximum Earnings $40.75 $38.75 $35.25 $40.75 $38.50 
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Table A.3. Average buyer prices and tax burden as a percent of tax revenue 
Treatment 
Average buyer 
price 
(ED) 
Total tax 
revenue 
(ED) 
Proportion of 
the tax revenue 
paid by the 
buyer 
(percent) 
Proportion of 
the tax revenue 
paid by the 
seller 
(percent) 
1.     Double auction, tax on buyer, four 
markets trading in one session. 
41.8 181.2 50.0 50.0 
2.     Double auction, tax on seller, four 
markets trading in one session. 
42.4 180.4 55.1 44.9 
3.     Posted offer, tax on buyer, low 
information, four markets trading in one 
session. 
43.9 133.6 67.9 32.1 
4.     Posted offer, tax on seller, low 
information, four markets trading in one 
session. 
44.7 124.8 74.5 25.5 
5.   Double auction, tax on buyer, two markets 
trading in a mixed session with row 6 
42.1 182.0 52.9 47.1 
6.  Double auction, tax on seller, two markets 
trading in a mixed session with row 5 
42.3 182.0 54.3 45.7 
7.  Posted offer, tax on buyer, high information, 
four markets trading in one session 
43.7 161.4 66.2 33.8 
8.  Posted offer, tax on seller, high information, 
four markets trading in one session 
43.3 162.4 62.9 37.1 
9.  Posted offer, tax on buyer, low information, 
two markets trading in a mixed session 
with row 10 
44.4 128.4 71.7 28.3 
10. Posted offer, tax on seller, low information, 
two markets trading in a mixed session 
with row 9 
44.0 141.2 68.8 31.2 
11. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high 
information, two markets trading in 
mixed session with row 12 
43.4 166.4 63.7 36.3 
12. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high 
information, two markets trading in 
mixed session with row 11 
43.8 157.6 66.8 33.2 
Notes: The estimates reported above are based on the data from the last fifteen trading periods of each 
treatment. The average buyer and seller prices from the DATB treatment are used as the baseline to 
calculate the incidence of the other three treatments. Figures reported in the table are rounded to first 
decimal place. 
 
51 
 
 
2. Online Figures 
 
 
Figure A.1. Induced demand and supply schedules  
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 Figure A.2. Autocorrelation plots for the baseline treatments (last fifteen trading periods) 
 
 
a) Double auction market with tax on buyer          b) Double auction market with tax on seller 
  
 
  
c) Posted offer market with tax on buyer                 d) Posted offer market with tax on seller 
 
 
